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very similar to those undertaken by other de-
veloped countries over the same period, the
extent of the reforms, and in some cases the
nature of the reforms, were internationally
unique.
David Henderson, the British economist who
spent most of the eighties and early nineties as
head of the Economics and Statistics Depart-
ment of the OECD in Paris, reviewed the New
Zealand reforms in 1996 and commented that
“the extent of liberalisation over the last 12
years places New Zealand in a class of its own
within the OECD area.”  He went on to ob-
serve that “in no other OECD country has there
been so systematic an attempt at the same time
to redefine and limit the role of government,
and to make public agencies and their opera-
tions more effective, more transparent, and
more accountable.”2
These reforms have taken New Zealand to
fourth place in The 1998 Index of Economic
Freedom, published by the Heritage Founda-
tion and the Wall Street Journal, ahead of all
the countries of Europe and North America.
They also led to New Zealand’s being ranked
fifth in the Global Competitiveness Index pub-
lished by the World Economic Forum in July/
August 1997, behind only Singapore, Hong
Kong, the United States and Canada.
Perhaps because of the extent to which the re-
forms have attracted the attention of newspapers
such as The Economist and the Financial Times,
there has been a steady procession of people –
politicians, bureaucrats, and journalists – from
a wide range of countries, keen to know what
can be learnt from New Zealand’s experience.
New Zealand’s economic reforms:  a model for change?
Introduction
Over the last 14 years, the New Zealand econ-
omy has been through a very wide range of
economic reforms.  You have invited me to
comment on whether those reforms have
‘worked’, and whether they can, in any sense,
be seen as a model for change in other coun-
tries.  While I appreciate your compliment in
inviting me to give this address, I am mindful
of the risks in accepting your invitation!  With-
in New Zealand, there is still some debate about
whether the reforms have worked, and, even
though I myself believe that the reforms have
been very beneficial for New Zealand, I am very
reluctant to appear to be proselytising non-New
Zealanders.  Every country has its own unique
set of problems, the product of its history, its
culture and its political traditions.
As Governor of New Zealand’s central bank,
moreover, my primary responsibility is to de-
liver stability in the general level of prices, since
that is seen, rightly in my view, as the best con-
tribution which monetary policy can make to
New Zealand’s social and economic well-be-
ing.  I do not have a responsibility for fiscal
policy, trade policy, labour market policy, edu-
cation policy or a whole host of other policies.
But, of course, monetary policy does not, and
cannot, operate in a vacuum and, in particular,
it cannot be considered in isolation from other
aspects of government policy.  For this reason,
those of us who are responsible for formulat-
ing monetary policy must inevitably be
well-informed about other aspects of public
policy, and must be able to assess the implica-
tions for the way in which the economy will
behave.  So it is inevitable and appropriate that,
from time to time, I get drawn into comment-
ing on economic policy more broadly.
This is not the place to describe those reforms
in detail,1 but it is relevant to note that, while in
many respects New Zealand’s reforms were
1 I attempted to describe the reforms in New Zealand’s
Remarkable Reforms, the Fifth IEA Annual Hayek Memorial
Lecture, delivered in London on 4 June 1996.
2 David Henderson, Economic reform:  New Zealand in an
International Perspective, New Zealand Business
Roundtable, August 1996.161 RESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND:  Bulletin Vol 61 No.2
So the question is certainly relevant.  Have the
reforms worked, and are they in any sense a
model for other countries?
A great deal has been
accomplished
Without doubt, a great deal has been accom-
plished.
We have made enormous progress in dealing
with previously-persistent fiscal deficits, and
are now one of the very few OECD countries
running a genuine fiscal surplus (that is, a sur-
plus without taking into account the proceeds
of asset privatisation).  Indeed, the financial
year ending at the end of this month marks the
fifth consecutive year of fiscal surplus (this one
of nearly 3 percent of GDP) and, partly as a
result, the ratio of net public sector debt to GDP
has fallen from over 50 percent in 1992 to
around 25 percent currently, one of the lowest
such ratios in the developed world.  The latest
estimate by the New Zealand Treasury is that
this ratio will fall to around 20 percent within
two years.  This decline in public sector debt
will clearly help New Zealand to deal with the
fiscal implications of our gradually ageing pop-
ulation and in due course permit reductions in
the total tax burden, while on-going fiscal sur-
pluses reduce the competition for the available
pool of savings, allowing interest rates to be
lower than would otherwise be the case.
We have made great progress in eliminating
inflation, in part at least because we have cre-
ated an institutional structure which insulates
the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy from
short-term political pressures, while leaving the
strategic decision about the inflation rate clearly
in the hands of the elected Government.3  Meas-
ured consistently with that of other countries,
New Zealand’s consumer price inflation has
been among the lowest in the world since 1991.
We have made great progress in ‘getting the
signals right’ by eliminating quantitative im-
port restrictions completely, substantially
reducing tariffs, abolishing export subsidies,
greatly improving the tax system (by introduc-
ing a no-exceptions single-rate Value Added
Tax, abolishing wholesale sales taxes, reduc-
ing marginal income tax rates, and reducing
scope to avoid taxes), freeing up the financial
system, and reducing the distortions and inef-
ficiencies caused by many unnecessary rules
and regulations.
We have greatly improved the efficiency of re-
source use in the public sector, by corporatising
and privatising many of the trading activities
and by insisting on much greater accountabili-
ty in the core public sector, partly through the
simple expedient of introducing proper account-
ing principles to the public sector.  (In the case
of the Reserve Bank, operating costs are some
40 percent lower now than they were at the
beginning of this decade, even in nominal
terms, despite essentially unchanged outputs.)
We have seen a considerable change in the re-
lationship between employers and employees,
both by opening up the economy to greater in-
ternal and external competition (which has
made employers and employees recognise the
extent of their common interest) and by chang-
ing the legislative framework within which
industrial negotiations take place.
We have seen a transformation in the views of
most of those close to the public policy formu-
lation process, bureaucrat and politician alike.
For example, all six political parties elected to
Parliament in 1996 now support the importance
of low inflation, and all but one party supports
the present institutional framework within
which monetary policy is conducted.  All of
the parties elected to Parliament except one
supports the New Zealand economy remaining
open to the global economy – meaning support
for both a continued reduction in tariff protec-
tion and continued openness to foreign
3 A paper by Clive Briault, Andrew Haldane, and Mervyn King
of the Bank of England, presented to the Seventh
International Conference of the Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, in October 1995, noted
that ‘New Zealand stands out (in their survey of 11 central
banks) as an obvious outlier, with a greater degree of
accountability per unit of independence than any other
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investment.  As an illustration of that, motor
vehicle tariffs, which stood at 55 percent in
1981 and which have been gradually reduced
ever since, were removed completely in last
month’s Budget with almost no political debate,
despite the resultant closure of the four remain-
ing car assembly plants and some component
manufacturers.
But the results of the reforms are,
in some respects, perplexing
And the results of all this policy progress?
In some cases, measurably dramatic and posi-
tive, as in the reduction in the ratio of public
sector debt to GDP, the improvement in our
inflation performance from one of the worst in
the OECD to one of the best, and the continued
diversification of our export trade, both by prod-
uct and by market.  Our unemployment rate, at
7.1 percent, is much higher than anybody feels
comfortable with, and indeed it is higher than
the measured unemployment rate when the re-
forms began in 1984.4  But despite all the
removal of protection, removal of subsidies,
corporatisation, privatisation, and public sec-
tor reform – all of which had the effect of
increasing unemployment in the short term –
our unemployment rate remains lower than that
in Australia and Canada, and well below the
level of unemployment in most of western Eu-
rope.
In some cases, the results of the reforms have
been dramatic and positive but not so easily
measurable, at least in terms of conventional
macroeconomic statistics.  As a consumer, one
is aware of the enormously greater convenience
of seven-day-a-week shopping, of the vastly
improved telecommunications, of the better
quality of domestic aviation services, of the shift
in bargaining power from bank to customer in
the banking sector, and all the rest.
In terms of productivity per person, however,
the results are perplexing.  This is, after all,
where one would expect to see the dividend
from all the reforms of the last 14 years.  Yet
the statistics on aggregate productivity do not
show the dramatic improvement which one
would have expected.5  Indeed, in recent years
growth in labour productivity has been less than
the 1 percent per annum which is the US norm,
and well below the rates of productivity growth
prevalent, at least until recently, in the fast-
growing economies of East Asia.
The low rates of growth in labour productivity
revealed by the aggregate numbers are particu-
larly surprising when set against the
innumerable stories of extremely dramatic im-
provements in productivity at the level of the
firm – Solid Energy, the government-owned
coal-mining company, cutting staff numbers by
more than 50 percent while increasing the ton-
nage of coal mined; Railways cutting staff from
23,000 to 5,000 while increasing the tonnage
of freight handled; the Reserve Bank cutting
its staff by approximately 50 percent while
maintaining its outputs; and literally hundreds
of similar stories from both the public and pri-
vate sectors.
And these anecdotes are supported by analysis
of productivity changes at the industry level.
One study, for example, based on 20 industries,
concluded that for the majority of sectors (13)
‘liberalisation appears to have improved pro-
ductivity growth rates.  On average, overall TFP
(total factor productivity) growth increased
from 0.7 percent in the pre reform period to 2.4
percent in the post reform period.  Average TFP
growth increased from 1.86 percent pre reform
to 4.88 percent in the post reform period in those
sectors selling their output primarily in the ex-
port market .... average TFP growth increases
4 It is clear with the wisdom of hindsight that there was a
great deal of disguised unemployment, and under-
employment, in 1984, which subsequent reform brought out
into the open.
5 Viv Hall has found that labour productivity averaged 1.9
percent per annum between 1985 and 1995, virtually
indistinguishable from the 1.8 percent achieved between
1978 and 1985, while total factor productivity actually fell
from 1.2 percent per annum in the earlier period to 0.9 percent
per annum in the later period.  ‘New Zealand’s Economic
Growth:  Fantastic, Feeble, or Further Progress Needed?’,
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in importables .... and non-tradeables were more
modest between the two periods, from -1.16
percent and 0.9 percent to -0.14 percent and
1.66 percent, respectively.’6
The explanation for this apparent paradox – of
very rapid improvements in labour productivi-
ty at the level of the firm while productivity in
the economy as a whole has been improving
only slowly – is not at all clear.  In part, the
explanation may lie in the extent to which we
have taken out improvements in productivity
in ways which are not picked up in GDP statis-
tics (such as more convenient shopping hours,
better quality restaurants, and greater respon-
siveness from the telephone company to
requests for new phone connections).  In part,
the explanation may lie in the way in which the
value of much of the public sector’s output is
measured (for example, since the value of the
Reserve Bank’s outputs are, for the purposes
of calculating GDP, assumed to be equal to the
cost of our inputs, productivity growth is as-
sumed to be zero, and of course some of the
most dramatic examples of productivity im-
provement in recent years have been in the
public sector).  In part, the explanation may lie
in the fact that, especially in the last five years
or so, we have been creating a huge increase in
jobs for people who had been made unem-
ployed during the process of restructuring the
economy, people who, almost by definition,
were relatively less productive than the aver-
age of those already employed.
There are two other possible explanations which
may be relevant.  The first concerns the quality
of New Zealand management.  In a recent arti-
cle in The Times,7 Anatole Kaletsky argued that
what he described as ‘British industry’s abys-
mal record of inefficiency and low productivity
growth – a record of almost miraculous under-
performance stretching back to the start of this
century unmatched by any other country, with
the possible exception of a few African and
Communist dictatorships’ might be due not to
recalcitrant trade unions and restrictive labour
practices and not to the quality of British
schools, but rather to the quality of British man-
agement.
I am certainly in no position to judge that ques-
tion in the case of the United Kingdom, but
there are at least some people beginning to
worry in New Zealand that our management
skills have not been up to the demands of oper-
ating in a global environment.  If indeed poor
quality of management is one of the reasons
for the relatively poor productivity performance
of New Zealand in recent years, there are prob-
ably grounds for expecting this situation to
improve in the medium term.  There was little
reason to invest in management skills when
operating in a highly protected environment,
with high inflation and a depreciating exchange
rate making it relatively easy to make satisfac-
tory nominal profits.  Those days are now gone.
Certainly, to the extent that poor management
has been part of the reason for our relatively
poor productivity performance, one might rea-
sonably expect this problem to disappear, now
that we have a very open, competitive, econo-
my, with low inflation creating no artificial
distortions.  Our openness to foreign investment
and immigration can also be expected to help
in this regard, and it is already true that the sen-
ior executives of some of our most dynamic
organisations, in both the public and private
sectors, are non-New Zealanders.
Secondly, and less related to productivity as
such than to our overall growth rate, it is unfor-
tunately true that the industries in which New
Zealand has traditionally been most productive
– those based on our natural resource endow-
ment of land and sea – are also those industries
which face very high entry barriers in the mar-
kets of the world.  For example, over the last
year or so, the New Zealand dairy industry has
developed a new ‘spreadable butter’ with con-
siderable market appeal, only to find barriers
to its sale in Europe on grounds which appear,
at least to this observer, totally specious.  Sim-
ilarly, although we are one of the world’s largest
cheese exporters, and have developed a range
6 Fare, Rolf, Shawna Grosskopf, and Dimitri Margaritis,
‘Productivity Growth’, in B Silverstone, A. Bollard and R.
Lattimore (eds), A Study of Economic Reform:  The Case of
New Zealand, 1996.
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of sophisticated cheeses in recent years, we are
limited to a tiny quota of about 0.5 percent of
the US cheese market.  If New Zealand pro-
ducers want to sell butter to Japan, they find
that Japan has limited total butter imports, from
all sources, to less than 2,000 tonnes each year,
with sales beyond that tiny quota facing a 700
percent tariff.  Measures of this kind, designed
to protect special interest producer groups in
the major markets of the world, damage the
consumers in those markets and inhibit growth
in both importing countries and New Zealand.
In the Reserve Bank’s judgement, New Zea-
land’s sustainable economic growth rate is now
around 3 percent annually.  This may seem dis-
appointing compared with the much faster
growth rates which have been common in East
Asia, or with the much faster growth which
New Zealand itself achieved during the early
nineties, when we were able to achieve a once-
only increase in the number of those employed
by reducing unemployment from 11 percent to
6 percent.  But New Zealand starts from a level
of national income per head which is already
well above that in most of the countries of East
Asia, and as a result there is very much less
scope for ‘catch-up growth’ by simply adopt-
ing the technology of more affluent countries.
Growth of 3 percent per annum would still be
markedly better than the growth which we
achieved prior to the implementation of re-
forms.8  It is higher than the estimated US
sustainable growth rate of about 2.5 percent
annually.
Moreover, it is just possible that, as the house-
hold sector reaches a point where it no longer
wishes to increase its debt levels as rapidly as
has been the case over the last decade, interest
rates will fall somewhat, and a higher propor-
tion of available investment funds will find their
way into the form of plant and equipment, with
resultant benefit for growth in both productiv-
ity and aggregate output.
So have the reforms worked, and
are they a model for others?
Given that nobody can be absolutely certain
how New Zealand’s economy would have
evolved in the absence of the reforms, it is, of
course, impossible to be too dogmatic on the
question of whether they have ‘worked’.  But I
have not the slightest doubt that the reforms
‘worked’ in comparison to a situation where we
tried to continue with the policies of the late
seventies and early eighties, with extensive pro-
tection, subsidies, price and wage controls, high
inflation, large fiscal deficits and all the rest.  It
seems impossible to believe that using two peo-
ple to do a job that one person could do would,
in any sense, be an improvement.  It seems
impossible to believe that countries get better
policies by hiding the full fiscal implications
of what they are doing from the public.  It seems
impossible to believe that the well-being of the
public at large is well served by protecting the
vested interests of particular producers.  To the
extent that some countries are still trying to re-
sist those elementary principles, the New
Zealand reforms can well serve as a model for
others.
And indeed there are policy areas where other
countries appear to be following the New Zea-
land approach reasonably explicitly, including
the way in which we have established the rela-
tionship between Government and central bank.
But nobody should imagine that sweeping re-
form of the kind implemented in New Zealand
in recent years is painless, or politically easy.
Many of those most directly involved paid with
their political lives.  There are many New Zea-
land observers who believe that the speed and
scale of the reforms were only possible because
of a rather unique coincidence – a serious run
on the currency creating a widespread sense of
crisis, dedicated officials (I was not one of
them), and almost suicidally courageous poli-
ticians, all in the context of a unicameral,
first-past-the-post electoral system, based on the
Westminster relationship between Government
and Parliament.  Could it have been done dif-
ferently?
8 As Fare, Grosskopf and Margaritis have observed, ‘in the
period 1960 to 1984, the New Zealand economy had one of
the lowest rates of real economic growth in the OECD.’  Op.
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From the point of view of economic theory,
there is an argument that the sequencing of the
reform process was a good deal less than ideal,
and that as a consequence the economic and
social costs of the reforms were greater than
should have been the case.  In this view, the
complete liberalisation of financial markets
early in the process, coupled with a monetary
policy aimed at achieving a reasonably rapid
reduction in inflation, initially large fiscal def-
icits, and a considerable delay in deregulating
the labour market, was a recipe for trouble.
Undertaking the reforms in that sequence
meant, it is argued, that the real exchange rate
was pushed up excessively, with the inevitable
result that growth in industries which should
have benefited by the reform process was much
slower than would otherwise have been the
case, and unemployment was far higher than
should have been the case.
To me, this seems a plausible argument, al-
though it may also be irrelevant.  As several of
those most closely involved in the reform proc-
ess have pointed out in response, undertaking
far-reaching economic reform is never easy in
a political democracy, and reforms have to be
undertaken when they are politically feasible,
which is not always the same as when they are
economically optimal.  Moreover, it is mislead-
ing to imply that, had the sequencing been
different, even in some theoretical sense opti-
mal, there would have been no costs involved
in the reforms.  Inevitably, moving people from
highly protected industries to unprotected in-
dustries involves some social and economic
cost, just as reducing inflation from a high lev-
el to a low level involves cost.  My judgement
is that the additional costs imposed by the se-
quencing of the reforms were not great,
although of course it is impossible to prove that
contention one way or the other.  It is probably
also true that the early liberalisation of finan-
cial markets, seen by some observers as one of
the sequencing mistakes, generated the eco-
nomic pressures which made a number of the
later reforms politically possible.
Could the reforms have been handled differ-
ently politically?  There are certainly some who
believe that successive Governments bulldozed
through the reforms against the wishes of the
general public.  Indeed, in significant part as a
result of a perception that successive Govern-
ments lied to the electorate during the reform
process, we have adopted an electoral system
(a form of proportional representation closely
modelled on the German electoral system)
which many New Zealanders who voted for it
now appear to regret, and which may well have
reduced the scope for further reform.  As some-
body who is strongly committed to the
democratic process, I certainly worry at the
extent to which the reform process got well
ahead of public opinion.
But, when I feel like criticising the reformers
for not explaining their intentions in advance
of making dramatic changes, I recall a conver-
sation which I had with a group of elderly
gentlemen in late 1984 shortly after the then-
Labour Government introduced a tax surcharge
on the taxpayer-funded retirement income
scheme – which effectively means-tested that
scheme, despite the Labour Party’s strong com-
mitment not to means-test the scheme prior to
the 1984 election.  My friends were indignant
at the Government’s deceit.  I asked them
whether they were confident that the original
retirement scheme, without some form of means
test, was economically sustainable in the long
term.  No, they thought it was probably not sus-
tainable without some form of means test, and
indeed its continuation without a means test
would almost certainly, in their opinion, create
major strains on the economy.  I then asked
whether they thought a political party could
become Government if, before the election, they
pledged to introduce a means test for the
scheme.  Not a chance, they agreed with alac-
rity.  Then I asked them whether they were
suggesting that the Labour Party had had a
moral obligation to lie.  They did not like that
conclusion, and neither did I, but I am remind-
ed of the conversation whenever it is suggested
that Governments should not undertake reforms
until a majority of the population support those
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The reality is that Governments have a right,
indeed a duty, to give a lead.  Sometimes they
face situations not contemplated when they are
campaigning for office.  Sometimes they are
simply unaware of existing reality when they
are formulating their campaign pledges.  Clear-
ly the cost of moving too far ahead of public
opinion can be serious erosion of public confi-
dence in government and in the political process
itself.  The cost of not undertaking necessary
reform, however, is measured in entrenched
unemployment and serious public sector debt
problems of the kind common in many other
OECD countries today, or even more serious
problems of the kind which some of the coun-
tries of East Asia now face, with reform
eventually having to be undertaken as the pre-
condition of international support.
Looking forward, some ongoing
worries
Looking forward, what are the things which
worry me?  There are three in particular.
First, despite the widespread consensus among
policy-makers about the benefits of recent re-
forms, a great many of the general public are
much less convinced of their merits, even now
that they have been implemented.  There is a
widespread perception, for example, that pri-
vatisation has done nothing but alienate New
Zealand control of important assets, even
though, when pressed, very few people would
want to return to the levels of service provided
by the pre-privatisation Telecom or Air New
Zealand.  There is a widespread perception that
the reforms ‘have made the rich richer and the
poor poorer’ and, while it is probably true that
the reforms have widened the distribution of
incomes somewhat,9 it is a good deal less obvi-
ous that the distribution of wealth has become
more uneven as a result of the reforms.  Thus,
for example, it is clear on a moment’s reflec-
tion that those groups who were ‘wealthy’ in
pre-reform New Zealand – large-scale land-
owners, large-scale commercial property
owners, highly protected manufacturers, those
with inherited import licences – have been
materially disadvantaged by the reforms.  So,
while the data do not exist to comment on the
current distribution of wealth, it is at least clear
that many of those who were rich prior to the
reforms were not made richer by the reforms
themselves.10
Unfortunately, too many New Zealanders still
believe that economic reform was driven by the
desire to test some abstract theory, not to im-
prove the social and economic outcomes for all
New Zealanders.  Successive Governments
have been unable to persuade a significant
number of New Zealanders that continuing on
the pre-1984 track was simply not a viable op-
tion.  This failure constitutes a risk to the
continuation of rational policy in the years
ahead, even though, as indicated, policy-mak-
ers in almost all political parties support most
of the reforms which have been undertaken.
Secondly, I myself feel quite uneasy about New
Zealand’s continuing heavy dependence on the
savings of others, or in other words, about the
continuing size of the current account deficit.
The last year in which New Zealand ran a cur-
rent account surplus was 1973 and, while the
deficit has been quite small in some of the in-
tervening years, it is currently around 8 percent
of GDP.  As a consequence of this long succes-
sion of deficits, the ratio of the country’s net
external liabilities to GDP is almost certainly
over 80 percent and rising (the data are not ter-
ribly reliable), the highest of any developed
country.
9 Available data is not totally conclusive about what happened
to income distribution as a result of the reforms.  Using
Census data, the National Bank of New Zealand concluded
that “what we can unambiguously say is that the distribution
of gross incomes is more equal in both 1986 and 1991 than
in 1981.”  (National Bank of New Zealand, National Business
Outlook, April 1993.)  George Barker found that “incomes
became less equally distributed’ over the period 1987 to 1991,
largely as a result of the rise in unemployment over that
period.”  (Income Distribution in New Zealand, 1996.)  But
there are some indications that this trend has been reversed
as unemployment has fallen from its 1991 peak.
10 Interestingly, of the 11 wealthiest individuals in New Zealand
listed by the National Business Review in August 1987, five
saw their wealth substantially or completely eliminated
during the ensuing decade, two saw their wealth very
substantially reduced (from an aggregate of some $900
million to an estimated $320 million), and the other four
saw an increase in their combined wealth from $750 million
to $1,015 million, an increase almost exactly in line with
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Does that actually matter?  There is a respecta-
ble school of thought that argues that it does
not.  Milton Friedman, for example, has sug-
gested that the world would be a much happier
place if governments did not calculate or pub-
lish balance of payments data.  Certainly, in a
situation where the Government is running a
budget surplus, the existence of a balance of
payments deficit necessarily means that it is the
private sector of the economy which is spend-
ing more than it is earning.  And it is not
self-evident that that should be a concern of the
Government.  Nor is it a situation that will con-
tinue indefinitely – either private New Zealand
borrowers will decide that they have taken on
enough liabilities, and so reduce their borrow-
ing; or foreign creditors will decide New
Zealanders have taken on enough liabilities, and
will reduce their lending.  Either way, the bal-
ance of payments deficit will tend to cure itself.
Indeed, to the extent that the recent strong rise
in the balance of payments deficit represents
an adjustment by the household sector to the
improved outlook for incomes and the very
much greater availability of credit than in the
years prior to reform, with a resultant step in-
crease in the ratio of debt to household sector
income, it may well cure itself quite quickly.
But I have two concerns.  One is that our con-
tinuing propensity to spend more than we earn
will, in time, result in an ever-increasing pro-
portion of New Zealand assets being owned
overseas.  Nothing much wrong with that eco-
nomically if that is what we collectively want,
but it runs the risk of provoking a political back-
lash at some stage by those who, having spent
beyond their means for decades, suddenly re-
sent foreign savers who have been more
prudent.  Clearly, foreign savers who provide
us with the capital which we are reluctant to
provide for ourselves require a return on that
capital, and the interest and profits accruing to
foreign savers are already a significant debit
item in the balance of payments.
The second concern is the costs of the transi-
tion which could be involved in moving from
deficit to balance or surplus, for if it is credi-
tors who decide that enough is enough, the
likely symptoms of the decision would be a
sharply lower exchange rate and sharply high-
er interest rates, as the inflow of foreign funds
is curtailed or reversed.  These moves would
abruptly shift resources back into the export-
and import-competing sectors of the economy,
and shake them out of other parts of the econo-
my.  (Indeed, to some extent this has been
happening over the last 12 months, with a fall
in the New Zealand dollar and a rise in interest
rates over that period.)  Economists talk about
‘shifting resources’ as if this can always be
achieved smoothly and painlessly.  In reality,
however, an abrupt fall in the exchange rate and
commensurately sharp increase in interest rates
would be accompanied by considerable social
and economic cost, as businesses in the domes-
tic sectors of the economy, such as construction,
retailing, and restaurants, face financial diffi-
culties and, in some cases, fail.  Unfortunately,
no economist I have met has any easy solutions
to this awkward dilemma, other than to have
the public sector continue to run budget sur-
pluses as a contribution to total national savings.
Certainly we know that the old remedies – at-
tempts to restrain imports, or
artificially-engineered reductions in the real
exchange rate – always end up doing more harm
than good.
Finally, there appears to be considerable unfin-
ished business in the education, health, and
social welfare areas.  Until these areas have
been effectively addressed, it is hard to argue
that New Zealand can be regarded as a com-
pletely satisfactory model for anybody.
In education, it seems to me a cause for serious
concern that so many of our high school grad-
uates (indeed, so many of our university
graduates) have only the most rudimentary idea
of how to write grammatical English; and that
while Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Hong
Kong occupied the top four places in the Third
International Maths and Science Study, New
Zealand ranked only 24th (out of the 41 coun-
tries in the study).  It cannot be good for our
economic growth, or for the employment pros-
pects of many of our young people, that,
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nearly half the workforce in New Zealand can-
not read well enough to work effectively in a
modern economy.11  While this is, in aggregate,
a similar situation to that in Australia, the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the United States, it is a matter
for particular concern that 70 percent of Maori
New Zealanders, and about three-quarters of
Pacific Island New Zealanders, are function-
ing “below the level of competence in literacy
required to effectively meet the demands of
everyday life.”12  We all have our own favoured
solution for these educational deficiencies.  But
whatever policies are followed, the one thing
that is obvious is that future prosperity will
depend heavily on the pace at which New Zea-
landers develop their ‘human capital’.  And this
is true both for the obvious reason that unskilled
people will be increasingly less needed in the
modern economy and for the perhaps less ob-
vious reason that, unless New Zealanders have
a proper education, the ability of Governments
to make sensible policy choices will be severe-
ly restricted.
In health, I frankly have no idea whether poli-
cy is now on the right track or not.  To me, it
seems entirely sensible to separate the funding
from the provision of hospital services, but suc-
cessive Governments have so far failed to
explain the nature of the policy dilemma to the
general public, who often seem to imagine that
Governments can continue to fund an ever-in-
creasing level of ever-more-expensive medical
procedures, for a steadily ageing population,
without using either price or queuing as a ra-
tioning device.  If Government continues to
provide hospital care without charging users for
that care, it seems to me inevitable that we will
have either waiting lists of some kind or arbi-
trary rules defining the services which the
taxpayer will fund.
In social welfare, the widespread perception is
that the Government has effectively walked
away from its obligation to provide income
support to those in need, despite the fact that
expenditure on social welfare will consume 36
percent of total government expenditure in
1997/98 (nearly 13 percent of GDP), above the
30 percent of total government expenditure in
1984/85 (about 11 percent of GDP), and that
those dependent on the Domestic Purposes
Benefit, for example, have increased from
53,000 in 1984 to 115,000 in 1997/98.13  New
Zealand spends rather more of its GDP on gov-
ernment transfer payments than does Australia,
notwithstanding the higher unemployment in
Australia.  And yet, despite that – perhaps be-
cause of that? – New Zealand sees high levels
of family breakdown, very high levels of ex-
nuptial births (41.8 percent of all live births in
the year to March 1998), very high numbers of
children being brought up in single-parent fam-
ilies (especially among the Maori and Pacific
Island communities), and all of the poverty,
educational problems and crime often associ-
ated with these conditions.
Conclusion
Yes, the economic reforms of the last 14 years
have accomplished a great deal.  While there
may well have been other policy options which
might have been followed in 1984, continuing
with the policies which had been followed pri-
or to that time was clearly not one of them.
Some of the things that have been accomplished
may be a model for others, and indeed have
already been copied by others.  At a time when
a great many countries are grappling with how
to make retirement income schemes fiscally
sustainable, how to make their public sectors
more transparent and more accountable, how
to reform their taxation systems, and how to
dismantle the subsidisation of special interest
groups, we can take considerable satisfaction
at the progress made in New Zealand.
But there are no grounds for complacency.  Like
most other countries, New Zealand still needs
13 Taking expenditure on National Superannuation out of total
social welfare expenditure gives a ratio of social welfare
expenditure to GDP of 4.1 percent in 1984/85 and 7.4 percent
in 1997/98, showing an even more rapid increase than for
social welfare expenditure inclusive of expenditure on
National Superannuation.
11 Human Capital Investment: an International Comparison,
OECD, 1998.
12 Adult Literacy in New Zealand, Ministry of Education, 1998.169 RESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND:  Bulletin Vol 61 No.2
to continue seeking ways to improve produc-
tivity, to improve the quality of education, to
increase private sector savings, and to reduce
dependency.  Indeed, one of the lessons of re-
cent years is that continuous incremental policy
improvements may well be the only way of
avoiding the need for periodic dramatic and far-
reaching change.  Even those who strongly
support the reforms of the post-1984 period
would see that as an advantage.